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BABES IN BRIEFS: 
IS THE EDUCATION OF INFANTS A NECESSARY? 
by 
Robert s. Wiener* 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper the legal and equitable 
ramifications1 and sociological implications2 of education as 
a necessary for infants. What determines an infant's 
contractual liability? How does the law reflect and affect 
the societal role of infants? What is its view of the 
education of infants and social classes, parental power, and 
gender? How has it or should it have changed? 
Even if an infant disaffirms a common law contract, the 
court of equity may recognize a quasi-contract if the subject 
matter is a necessary. can education be a necessary so that 
an infant is liable for its procurement? As a matter of law, 
the answer depends on whether the education is common school, 
arts, religious, college, professional, such as 
apprenticeships, pharmacy, stenography, aviation, and 
correspondence courses, or from books. If the type of 
education can be a necessary, the trier of fact considers 
parental approval, job training, cheaper alternatives, and the 
social status, special suitability, and educational background 
of the infant to determine whether it is a necessary for the 
particular infant. 
I. COMMON LAW CONTRACTS 
An infant (also called a minor) is a person who lacks the 
capacity to contract due to youth. The age of contractual 
capacity, twenty-one at common law, 3 has been statutorily 
reduced to eighteen by most states. 4 A common law contract 
* Assistant Professor, Lubin School of Business, Pace 
University Westchester 
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formed by an infant is voidable-at best, that is, valid but 
able to be avoided by the infant. 5 The public policy 
rationale for this rule is that infants, as a matter of law, 
do not have the capacity to fully appreciate the obligations 
of a contract and "the law still guards the interests of 
minors against their own asswned improvidence and want of 
sound judgment 116 and from others who might take advantage of them. 
An infant .can disaffirm and thereby avoid contracts for 
lack of contractual capacity before achieving majority and for 
a reasonable time thereafter. 7 To disaffirm, the infant must 
be in privity of contract. An adult who forms a contract for 
an infant intended third party beneficiary cannot assert the 
infant's right of disaffirmance. In keeping with the rule 
that legal rights are one's own, if an adult permits an infant 
to contract or creates a suretyship contract to obtain a 
contract for an infant, the infant's right to disaffirm is not 
barred. 8 Age misrepresentation by an infant, innocent or 
fraudulent, generally will not prevent disaffirmance of the contract.9 
An infant who disaffirms a contract must give back any 
consideration received, but need not place the other party in 
status quo and that is not possible if the property received 
during infancy has been spent, consumed, or destroyed. 
Regarding intellectual benefit derived from education, an 
infant 11 is not precluded from disaffirming the contract and 
recovering the consideration that he paid, by the fact that he 
cannot return the instruction received. "10 However, materials, 
such as books received for a correspondence course, must be 
returned . 11 
A contract formed by an infant may be expressly 
or impliedly ratified when the infant gains contractual 
capacity at the age of majority. Implied ratification results 
from failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time of becoming 
a :major. 1z A reasonable time period may be as long as thirteen 
months. 13 
Infants who act like adults by marrying, 
children, or enlisting for war, may be held to have made valid 
common law contracts under case or statutory law. 14 some 
states have reduced the age of contractual capacity for 
educational loans to sixteen by statute. 15 The theory may be 
that infants wise enough to appreciate the value of higher 
education should have contractual capacity. This paper 
focuses on contracts made by infants who lack contractual capacity. 
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II. QUASI-CONTRACTS 
A. creation 
Infants can avoid all common law contractual liability. 
This principle standing alone .would make: parti.es reluctant to 
form any contracts with those for 
necessaries. Therefore, the court of equ1ty.has power to 
create a fictional quas i -contract when the d1saff1rmed common 
law contract was for necessaries for infant: "And the 
reason anciently assigned was, tha\6 wl.thout power he might be exposed to perish of want." 'r,he equ1table r7medy 
for non-performance of a quasi-contract l.S quantum meru1t or 
reasonable value. contracts and quasi-contracts sho.uld be 
distinguished. "[A)n unexecuted f.or necessar1.es 
be disaffirmed unless it be otherw1se 
Even executed contracts for necessaries can be 
A common law contract, once disaffirmed, is not binding • Of;11Y 
an equitable quasi-contract created in the o! necessar1es 
is unavoidable. Application of these can be 
confusing and, therefore, warrants In 
Rhode Island case of Pardey v. Co., 
Frank B. Pardey contracted with the 
company on 17 April 1893 "to work for the (Company) 1n the 
pattern-making business for the term of three years and a half 
•••• n19 Pardey was to be compensated with a salary and 
"reasonable and proper instruction as a pattern maker. The 
contract further provided that the sum of $1 per from the 
wages earned should be retained by the [Company] the 7nd 
of the term and should then be paid to (Pardey], w1th 
interest the end of each year, but that if (Pardey] 
should leave the employment before the end of the term, ?r be 
discharged for cause, the money retained should be 
At the time of entering the employment (PardeXJ a_m1n?r 
[eighteen years old] .... (Pardey) attained hl.s 1n 
July, 1895, and lef t the defendant's employment hl.s own 
accord september 7 1895. The amount of wages retal.ned under 
I 20 the contract ... is $124." 
Frank B. Pardey disaffirmed the contract. The court 
decided that 11 [Pardey] is mistaken in his supposition that the 
contract was voidable; for, though it is true generally that 
a minor cannot bind himself by his contracts, for want . of 
legal capacity, it is equally well that he may b1nd 
himself by a contract for necessaries, l.f reasonable, or by a 
contract beneficial to him. 1121 A modern court would decl.de 
that Pardey could avoid a common law contract created when he 
was an infant. 
The court found that the contract was for necessaries and 
"As the contract was binding on (Pardey ) , and he has violated 
it by leaving the employment, he must be considered to have 
forfeited the wages retained as provided by the contract 
n22 A modern court would find that a disaffirmed common 
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law contract is not binding and cannot be breached. A 
liquidated damages clause, such as the forfeiture clause here, 
is avoided with the contract. If the instruction received by 
Pardey was a necessary, he is "bound11 only to a quasi-contract 
and owes the company quantum meruit, the reasonable value of 
consideration received. and not returned. The court would find 
that the "wages retained" were "wages earned" and award them 
to Pardey as quantUll\ l!leruit or, perhaps, on a theory of 
constructive bailment. 
As with common law contracts, an infant, to be liable on 
a theory of quasi-contract, must be in privity of contract for 
the necessaries. If an obligation is assumed by a relative or 
friend to benefit an infant, the infant is an intended third 
party beneficiary of the contract formed and not personally 
liable. "It is essential to recovery that necessaries shall 
have been furnished on the credit of the inf ant. If furnished 
on the credit of his parent or guardian, he is not liable.n23 
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals held that "since the 
primary duty of support of an infant is on his father, the 
action for necessaries could not be maintained against the 
infant (because) the complaint does not allege that the 
services were rendered in reliance on the infant's credit 
(nor] that the services were performed at the request of the infant 1124 
A few cases relieve an infant of liability for 
necessaries even in quasi contract if an adult with legal 
responsibility for the infant is ready and willing to provide 
them. Even if a contract was formed by the infant, "an infant 
living with his father or guardian who is able and willing to 
furnish him with every thing suitable and necessary to his 
position in life cannot make a binding promise to pay even for 
necessaries. 1125 
In general, an infant who disaffirms a contract for 
legally necessary education is liable in quasi-contract. If 
the education is not a necessary, a disaffirming infant is 
free of both legal and equitable liability. Whether education 
can be a necessary is determined as a matter of law by its 
type. Whether possibly necessary education is a necessary for 
a particular infant is a matter of fact. 
B. Can This Type of Education Be a Necessary? 
What is a necessary? "(T]he law has never limited its 
definition of the term necessaries to those things which are 
strictly essential to the support of life,--as food, clothing, 
and medicine in sickness. "20 
Can education be a necessary? According to Blackstone, 
an infant may be obl i gated for "necessary meat, drink, 
apparel, physic and such other necessaries ; and likewise for 
his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit 
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himself afterwards. "27 If "profit" is the test of goc;>d 
teaching and instruction, is it limited to or 
include non-monetary rewards? Most courts ask the 
"would be better enabled to earn a as a 
of the education. However, one court 
playing was a necessary despite no short-term 
benefits. 29 
Necessaries are distinguished from non-necessaries or 
luxuries . To be a necessary, education "must be actually 
necessary, in the particular case, for use, not mere ornament, 
for substantial good, not mere pleasure; and must belong to 
the class which the law generally pronounces necessary .for 
infants . u30 If the education is in fact th1ngs 
essential to its proper study are also 
What class of education may be ·a necessary? 
English case law, "I have no doubt the proper.educatJ.on 
of an infant stands in the same pos1t1on EnglJ.sh as 
food and clothing supplied to him. "32 case law .1s in 
accord. "The authorities are agreed that .a p_;oper educatJ.on is 
a necessary."33 What is a proper educat1on. 
1. common school Education 
In 1844, the Vermont supreme court in Middlebury 
v. chandlerl" stated that "a good common school educatJ.on,.at 
the least, is now fully recognized as one of 
for an infant. Without it he would lack an acquJ.sJ.t1.on.wh17h 
would be common among his associates, he would suffer h1s 
subsequent influence and usefulness in society,. and would ever 
be liable to suffer in his transactions of .. such an 
education is moreover essential to the dJ.s?harge 
of civil, political, and religious duties." Th1s of 
common school education is accepted as a matter of law. 
What is a good common school education? The supreme 
court in virginia, in found "that it is a.reasonaJ;lle 
inference" that an infant who "was studying EnglJ.sh, 
Greek and mathematics" from age ten to thirteen "had 
a fair education • .,37 Additional education was not cons1dered 
necessary. 
What is today's equivalent of a common schc;>ol 
education? The answer probably is a "publ:Lc school and 
school" education . 38 
2. Arts Education 
can education in the arts be a necessary? In Sisson v. 
Schultz, 39 Burt Sisson, "a piano turner [sic) " sued 
Schultz for $5 for tuning a piano at the request of Schultz s 
wife and daughter. 40 "The father had provided piano lessc;ms 
for [his 12 year old daughter] and at the time she was tak1ng 
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one lesson a week. The piano was out of tune, no question of 
that and there is testimony, undisputed, that for the daughter 
to pursue her studies and become proficient in music, the 
piano had to be kept in tune •.•• [T)here is evidence that it 
had not been tuned for two or three years. 1141 Although the 
only precedent was that instruction in music and painting was 
not a necessary, 42 the trial court judge apparently found that 
piano tuning could be a necessary and submitted the question 
to the jury which decided that it was. The supreme court of 
affirmed stating that the question of whether a piano 
tun1ng was a .necessary was "a close one" and the trial court 
had not reversibly erred. 
3. Religious education 
. "No cases can be found either in England or in any of the 
Un:Lted States where the definition of instruction [of infants) 
has been carried so far as to include religious 
instruction. "43 "(T]he rent of a pew in a church where 
divine worship is held and religious instruction given is· 
(not) included in the list of articles known to the common law 
as necessaries."44 In this 1873 Connecticut case, the pew was 
rented for the wife and a daughter of the defendant without 
his authority or assent. 45 The judgment of the court seems 
at least in part, to result from reluctance to classify 
teaching of all religions as a necessary. "And indeed in this 
where there is no established church and every one is 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, no distinction could be made among the thousand 
different tenets and precepts that are tau2Pt upon the sabbath 
under the name of religious instruction." Perhaps, if such 
a distinction could constitutionally be made, this court would 
have found some religious instruction necessary. 
4. College education 
Can college education be a necessary?47 The 1844 
Middlebury College case distinguished between a good common 
school education and collegiate study. The court found that 
a college education could not be a necessary for "it is 
obvious that the more extensive attainments in literature and 
science must be viewed in a light somewhat different . Though 
they tend greatly to elevate and adorn personal character, are 
a source of much private enjoyment, and may justly be expected 
to prove of public utility, yet in reference to men in general 
they are far from being necessary in a legal sense. The mass 
of our citizens pass through life without them •..• I speak 
only of the regular and full course of collegiate study. "48 
More recent cases have been more open to finding that a 
college education could be a necessary. The 1912 New York 
Court of Appeals observed that "circumstances . . . may exist 
where even [a classical or professional) education might 
properly be found a necessary as matter of fact . n 49 In 1930, 
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the supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts stated in 
that "under present day conditions, .as in the past [cl.tl.ng 
Middlebury college), a college education is not, as matter of 
law · a necessary" but "very likely circwnstances could be 
which would warrant that conclusion as matter of f<:ct. •:so 
The supreme court of Michigan noted in that l.t 
has been held in several cases that a h 1gher or 
professional education is not a necessary,. the hol dl.ng 1s 
usually qualified by the statement that c1rcumstances may 
exist where such an education may be a necessary as a matter 
of fact. nS1 
In modern society, does a college come within 
the legal definition of a necessary? The College 
court's observation that a common school education "is now" 
fully recognized as a necessary implies that it not 
so and that other education might be so recogn1zed 1n the 
future. That case's tests of what is common among associates, 
the lack thereof resulting in suffering in 
influence and usefulness in society; and being ever 11able to 
suffer in business transactions may apply today to a college 
education. 52 
In fact an increasin& number of on all levels now 
require educati on. 5 Society has changed 
since 1844 and 1930 to find a college educat1on a legal 
necessary. 54 
s. Professional education 
The Middlebury College ruling that college. 
cannot be a necessary d i d not apply to all 
the col'Ql'l\on school. As the court said, ''I would not be 
understood as making any allusion to professional studies, or 
to the education and training which is requisite to the 
knowledge and practice of mechanic arts. These partake of the 
nature of apprenticeships, and stand on pecul1ar grounds of 
reason and policy. "55 
a. Apprenticeships: Apprenticeships can be necessary. 
under the apprenticeship contract Paraey, he.,"was to work 
for the (Company) in the pattern-mak1ng for a 
and "reasonable and proper instruction as a ·. 11 
The court referring to Middlebury College, dec1ded that 
is a contract for necessaries, and is beneficial to the 
plaintiff since it stipulates for his instruct i on in the 
useful art of pattern making, by which he would be better 
enabled to earn a livel i hood. " 57 
b. Pharmacy: As the supreme Court of Iowa said, "it is 
conceded that a course in pharmacy may come within the 
definition of necessaries for which a minor may be bound by 
contract. n58 In this case, the male infant "entered the 
pharmacy department of Highland Park College . . . for a course 
101 
of 12 weeks' instruction" and 11qu:{t the school soon 
thereafter" suing only "to recover the unearned portion of the 
sum so paid. "59 Therefore, the issue of whether the course was 
indeed a necessary was not raised. 
c. Stenography: A course in "the science or art of 
stenography" can be a necessary. 60 
d. Aviation: The Brooklyn Municipal court of New York 
decided in 1934, as · a matter of law, that "aviation 
instruction to prepare an infant to be a mechanic is a 
contract for necessaries. 1161 On the other hand, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts correctly decided in 1938 that 
education in elementary aviation, as a limited commercial 
pilot and as a transport pilot was not a necessary as a matter 
of law, but possibly as a matter of fact. 62 
e. Correspondence courses: What of mail-order education 
correspondence In 1909, a Maine trial court judge 
instructed the jury that "a course of correspondence 
instructi on in the electrical engineering course •.. seems to 
stand on intermediate ground, being between that of a trade 
and a learned profession."64 The jury decided that here such 
education was a necessary and the appellate court affirmed the 
decision. 
6. Books 
Education can also be gained directly from books. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals decided as a matter of law that 
reference books can be necessaries. 65 
B. Is This Education a Necessary for This Minor? 
Whether a type of education that can be a necessary is a 
necessary in a specific case is a question of fact. "What is 
a proper education in a given case depends on the 
circumstances of the case. " 66 Some factors considered may stay 
in the jury room, but 11The practical meaning of the term 
[necessaries ] has always been in some measure relative, having 
reference as well to what may be called the conventional 
necessities of others in the same walks of life with the 
infant, as to his own pecuniary condition and other 
circumstances. n67 
Par ental Approval 
Parental approval is a criterion for determin i ng if 
education i s a necessary. In 1912, New York's Court of 
Appeals said of unapproved enginee ring educati on, "the 
[infant) resided with a parent or guardi an able and anxi ous to 
give him any kind of an education that he desired, and that in 
defiance of parental authority he perversely took his own 
course to his injury and the overthrow of family disci pline. 1168 
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Therefore, if the infant and the parent or guardian disagree 
on the infant's education, the parent or guardian can prevent 
the infant from forming quasi-contracts for education. The 
infant is thereby given additional protection -- able to avoid 
quasi-contractual as well as common law contractual liability. 
The practical effect is that a party contracting with an 
infant to provide otherwise necessary education to that infant 
must first get parental or guardian approval or risk not only 
disaffirmance of the contract, but loss of a quantum meruit 
claim for the education's reasonable value. The rationale 
seems to be that what is necessary to an infant is best 
determined parents and guardians: 11Honor your father and 
your motheru and "Father knows best. 11 Surely, parents should 
decide what education for their children they want to fund, 
but the public policy served here is parental discipline, not 
the necessary education of infants.ro 
2. Job Training 
courts often consider job training the prime purpose of 
education, 71 that is, education t'by which he would be better 
enabled to earn a livelihood. 1172 If it will not achieve this 
goal, the education is not a necessary.n This view ignores 
education for the "intelligent discharge of civil, political 
and religious duties. 1174 
3. Cheaper Alternatives 
Courts consider the existence and quality of free or 
cheaper alternatives to the chosen education relevant to 
determine what constitutes a necessary. 
Is private education a necessary if free public education 
is available? In the 1902 case of Cory v. the Rhode 
Island court did not believe "that, simply because the state, 
through its public-school system, furnishes the facilities for 
a common-school education, the father cannot be held liable 
for anything in the way of supplemental or additional training 
for the child. If the child lives in a city like 
Providence, for instance, where, under its very superior 
system of public schools, which system includes both mental 
and manual training, he can obtain at the public expense an 
education which is probably equal, if not, indeed, superior, 
in practical value to a college education of a century ago, it 
may perhaps be doubted whether the father could be legally 
held liable for anything in addition thereto in the way of 
educational training. But where, as in the case at bar, the 
child lives in a country town, the schools of which do not 
furnish, and cannot be expected to furnish those facilities 
for a broad education, including a business or commercial 
training, which many city schools do furnish, we do not think 
it would be reasonable to hold that the father, by reason of 
the existence of public schools in the town, is necessarily 
relieved from all liability for the additional training of his 
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child. 1176 
Eugene F. Bear, an 18 year old infant, executed a $265 
promissory note for board and tuition for one session of 
common school education at Randolph Macon Academy. Whether 
"the sending of a boy to a distant academy, or boarding 
school, when there was a good public school and high school 
convenient to his home" was necessary was held a question of 
fact with "ample room for different conclusions to be drawn 
therefrom by reasonable The Virginia supreme Court of 
Appeals in 1921 approved putting the question to the jury. 
Under the facts of In re Johnstone's Estate78 , the infant 
perhaps was found by the jury to have had cheaper 
alternatives. Robert B. Johnstone Jr. nwas at the top of his 
class in high school. ui'9 He attended Dartmouth College in 
Hanover, New Hampshire paid for by a bank loan to his parents. 
u (T)here was available to the minor a full tuition scholarship 
to the University of Chicago. The [trial) Court could have 
found from the evidence that the minor might have received 
from Dartmouth either a scholarship or a loan on more 
favorable terms than the one received from La Salle National 
Bank. 11 The appellate court affirmed the jury's decision that 
a Dartmouth College education was not a necessary. 
Judicial review of consumer judgment contrasts with the 
law's hands-off policy on most business judgements. A court 
might even decide that public school education is more 
beneficial to the student than private school education. 00 
4. Social status 
The infant's social status can determine whether a type 
of education is a necessary. "(T)hat such an education and 
training as will fit one for the ordinary duties of life in 
the sphere in which he moves ••• should be so classed (with 
necessaries), we have no doubt. u81 11 [I )t is then for the jury 
to whether, under all the circumstances, the things 
were actually necessary to the position and 
condition of the infant •••• n 82 For example, college education 
might be a necessary if there are "extraneous circumstances 
.•. such as wealth, or station in society .••• u83 
What is a necessary is relative, as the 1909 Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court said, determined 11 by taking into 
consideration the infant 1 s state and condition in life ••. 
what might be considered necessaries for one infant would not 
be so considered for another whose status is different as to 
rank, fortune, and social position. The question is one to be 
determined from the facts surrounding each particular case. u 84 
In 1912, the New York Court of Appeals reiterated this 
reasoning. S!> Edward Connelly subscribed for a course of 
correspondence instruction in "Complete Steam Engineering" for 
$75.20 payable in $5 monthly The court stated 
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that "(t]he word 'necessaries,' as used in the law, is a 
relative term • • . and depends on the social position and 
situation in life of the infant as well as upon his own 
fortune and that of his parents. What would be necessary in 
a legal sense for an infant with ample means of his own might 
not be so for one with no means at all. "87 In American case 
law, one's means determine one's needs. 
The 1844 Virginia Supreme Court applied this principle 
and agreed with the lower courts that the infant E.C. Hayes's 
"circumstances and · prospects in life did not call for or 
justify further outlay in his education and support; and that 
common sense and prudence required that he be put to some 
business, so as to support himself.nM Here, the step-father 
"and his wife chose to maintain this boy ... , and to clothe 
him finer than other youths in the neighborhood, and give him 
a classical education, and furnish him with a riding-horse and 
other equipments for his pleasure; all these were luxuries and 
accomplishments; but, in no sense of the word, or of the law, 
could they be called or construed to be necessaries. "89 Don't 
get too uppity, says the law. Get a job. 
The wealth of an infant or the infant's parents alone 
will not assure the proving of a necessary, especially if the 
contract is ancillary to a questionable necessary and the 
parents are ready and willing to pay. In Moskow v. Marshall, 90 
a landlord sued for quantum meruit on the lease by two minors 
of a "suite of rooms in 'a privately owned dormitory ••. used 
exclusively for students at Harvard College'. "91 Not only 
the plaintiff prove that the living quarters were 11essentl.al 
to a college course11 , 92 he has to prove that the college 
education itself was a necessary. In this case, Richard B. 
Marshall and Lewis R. Burchill entered their second year at 
Harvard College in September 1928. The court considered their 
financial resources. "Burchill prepared for college at an 
academy 'located one hundred twenty miles from his home, where 
the annual fee was $1,050.' The father of ••• Marshall is 
associated with a firm or corporation 'in the bond 
business. tu93 But, it is not sufficient to find that 111 (a) 
college course was not extravagant or unreasonable in respect 
of either defendant, considering his father's means and manner 
of living and his own prospects in life,' do not go far enough 
for this purpose. The affirmative fact of necessity is not 
established by the negation of extravagance and 
unreasonableness. tt94 The landlord lost. 
Using social status to determine whether education is a 
necessary for an infant has troubled only the Supreme Judicial 
court of Massachusetts in a 1938 case governed by New York 
law, and then not enough to reverse the trial court's 
decision. "(John P. Adamowski's] father was a weaver. The 
money which the plaintiff (infant] paid was in part saved by 
himself from his manual labor and in part contributed by his 
family from their savings. In this country any 
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stratification of society is transient and shifting. Many a 
young man without capital or influential connection attains 
education and advancement in life through his own labors. It 
would be hard to say that education in aviation was less 
necessary for the plaintiff than it would have been for 
another more affluent.... The judge found that the courses in 
instruction were not necessaries for the plaintiff. That 
finding was proper, though possibly not required as matter of 
law. n 95 Perhaps the court wanted to avoid a finding that the 
education was a necessary which would have prevented, at least 
in part, the infant's recovery of the $1,600 he had paid. 
The courts give great weight to social status. Education 
necessary for one infant may not be necessary for another with 
equal educational background and intellectual ability, but 
lower social status. Why do most courts seem to accept fixed 
social classes? Is the law recognizing a psychological need 
developed by habituation to a certain style of life? Are 
necessaries determined by the class into which one is born and 
infants discouraged from aspiration and motivation for 
improvement? Are lower classes not expected to be educated 
above their current status? Or are less affluent infants 
being protected from liability beyond their financial means, 
whereas the wealthy can afford imprudent expenses?* Should 
infants of lower social status go to work rather than get more 
education? Is that advice wise? Is money spent on education 
a poor investment, or is it in fact an effective way to 
elevate social status? Or does the law ratify the self-
fulfilling prophecy that all those who have not yet achieved 
higher soc.ial status have not because they cannot? 
5. Special Suitability 
Special suitability of an infant for particular education 
might also be considered. For example, "that he exhibited 
peculiar indications of genius or talent, which would suggest 
the fitness and expediency of a college education for him, 
more than for the generality of youth in community. 1197 Also, 
in Sisson, "The daughter was 12 years old, showed aptitude for 
music, and was the pianist of the neighborhood. tt98 on the 
other hand, ordinary proficiency, even in Harvard College, is 
not sufficient; uNor does the fact that the defendants were 
able to continue in college until the second year of the 
course prove that .for them a college education was 
necessary. tt 99 
6. Educational Background 
An infant's educational background may be used to 
determine whether further education is a necessary. The 
Georgia Supreme Court considered in 1906 11 the particular 
sphere in society or calling in life which her previous 
education and attainments had prepared and fitted her to occupy or fill. n 100 
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In the International Text-Book Co. v. Doran 101 case of 
1907, James w. Doran, not yet 21, signed a contract for 
written instruction "of a preliminary and suitable nature in 
arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and mechanical drawing ••.. He 
had previously spent two years in a high school." The supreme 
court of Errors of Connecticut held that "Education furnished 
to an infant may be necessary to him, but only when it is 
suitable to his wants and condition. Whether education of a 
merely preliminary character, such as was furnished in the 
present case, was a necessary to one who had spent two years 
at a high school, was a question of fact •••• " 102 The court 
appears to think that although the instruction may be part of 
a good common school education, Doran should have learned the 
material the first time around. The finding may be that 
remedial education is not a necessary. 
7. Gender 
It seems that formal education of women was historically 
less common and courts were less likely to consider it 
necessary for them. 103 In the reported cases, women were 
educated only in piano playing, 104 stenography, lOS and 
religion. 106 Discussing college education, the Middlebury 
College court considers "men in general 11 • 107 In Adamowski, the 
judge's conception of class fluidity refers to "many a young 
man" 108 and may not extend to young women. 109 Gender 
stereotyping is now rejected, and what education is necessary 
should be determined by the same standards for both young men 
and young women. 
CONCLUSION 
How we view education tells us volumes about our society. 
Exploration of the legal and sociological aspects of the 
education of infants reveals, embedded in the law, acceptance 
of discredited views on such issues as parental power over 
infant children, continued separation of the classes, and the 
purpose of education. 
we should reconsider the assumptions underlying the cases 
concerning infants' contracts for education. As society 
changes, so must our view of what types of education can be 
necessaries. A college education is as much a necessary today 
as a common school education was in 1844. Even if it is 
appropriate for the law to play a role in the determination of 
the allocation of limited educational resources, it should be 
careful not to establish public policy that entrenches the 
status quo simply because of tradition. The minds of infants 
are our most valuable resource and should be nurtured to 
achieve the highest goals of which they are capable without 
regard to parental control, social status, and gender. 
Changes should therefore be' considered in statutory law, 
common law, and equitable principles. 
107 
The babes in briefs are our hope for the future. In 
society their education, including a college 
necessary and should be recognized as such by the law. 
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THE LIABILI'l'Y OF THE AGENT OF AN UNDISCLOSED OR PARTIALLY 
DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL 
by 
Gary K. Sambol" 
Introduction 
When an agent, acting within the scope of his authority 
on behalf of a principal, enters into a contract with a third 
party, the agent is usually not liable to the third party for 
the contract's performance . 1 However, under certain 
circumstances, an agent may be liable as a party to the 
contract. The purpose of this article is to discuss the rules 
of agency law which determine the liability of an agent who 
acts within the scope of his authority. 2 In the first part of 
this article, · I present the general rules in the abstract. 
Next, I discuss the theoretical justifications for an<;i the 
theoretical difficulties with these rules. Specifically, I 
attempt to point out the theoretical difficulties which arise 
when these rules are applied to cases where an agent 
negotiates a contract on behalf of a business which, 
unbeknownst to the third party, is owned by someone other than 
the agent, or if owned by the agent, is incorporated. I 
suggest that, in such cases, agent liability may result even 
where it is not a fair conclusion that the third party or the 
agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable or that 
the third party relied on the liability of the agent. 
Finally, I discuss an approach found in a few cases which 
denies agent liability whe.re it is not a fair conclusion that 
the third party dealt with the agent as an individual, rather 
than as an agent, or relied on his individual liability. 
General Rules 
Whether an agent is liable as a party to a contract made 
• Lecturer, Rutgers University School of Business - Camden and 
Rutgers University School of Law - camden. I wish to thank 
Sherrie L. Gibble and Jay M. Feinman for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
